We study an in…nitely repeated Bertrand game in which an i.i.d. demand shock occurs in each period. Each …rm receives a private signal about the demand shock at the beginning of each period. At the end of each period, information about the underlying demand shock and the rivals' prices becomes public. A …rm's pricing schedule can be either a sorting scheme, in which its price depends on its private signal, or a price-rigidity scheme in which the …rm charges the same price regardless of its private signal. We consider the optimal strongly symmetric perfect public equilibrium (SSPPE). The optimal SSPPE consists of a pro…le of price-rigidity schemes if the accuracy of the private signals is low. Moreover, the lower the variance of the demand shock, the more likely that a price-rigidity scheme is optimal. These
Introduction
Empirical evidence shows a positive correlation between concentration of industries and price-rigidity (Carlton (1984) ). This suggests that collusion may result in …rms'in ‡exible pricing behavior. Rigid-pricing refers to …rms' medium-run or long-run behavior, and these …rms are thus likely to face variations in their underlying economic environment. This seems puzzling, however, since colluding …rms might be able to earn more pro…t by adjusting their prices according to the variations. Colluding …rms should coordinate their pricing behavior in order to maximize their joint pro…ts.
Costs of coordinating pricing behavior are sources of rigid-pricing in a collusive industry. There are straightforward and classic examples of those costs. A straightforward one is the menu cost, i.e., a direct cost of changing price. This cannot explain price-rigidity if the magnitude of change is so substantial that adjusting price increases pro…ts net of menu costs. Another example is associated with the classic kinked demand curve (see, say, Tirole (1988) ). This theory is based on an assumption that each …rm believes that the others will respond to the …rm's price change only when it reduces the price. 1 I.e., there is a higher "cost" of upward price changes. The kinked demand curve generates a vertical segment in the MR curve for each …rm, and if MR=MC at this segment, a small change in the cost function does not alter the market price and the quantity. However, with ‡uctuating demand, price-rigidity occurs only if the kink arises at the same price regardless of the demand state, which is hard to justify.
Even without such costs, …rms may …nd it di¢ cult to coordinate their pricing behavior if each …rm receives private information prior to determining a price. When a colluding …rm is supposed to adopt a sorting pricing scheme in which its price depends on its private information, the …rm can dishonestly charge a price as if it would pretend to receive the corresponding false information. Colluding …rms might therefore need to engage in costly price wars to avoid such cheating. 2 These costs may outweigh the bene…ts of utilizing information. Firms can then avoid these costs if they adopt a rigid pricing scheme, which does not require that type of incentive compatibility. In fact, Scherer (1980, p180) gives a view on rigid-pricing consistent with coordination costs due to information asymmetry: "most oligopolies ... appear willing to forego the modest gains associated with micro-meter like adjustment of prices to ‡eeting changes in demand and costs in order to avoid the risk of more serious losses from poorly coordinated pricing policies and price warfare."
We study an in…nitely-repeated Bertrand game with homogeneous goods by two identical …rms, in which an i.i.d. demand shock occurs in each period. 3 Firms have a common, constant marginal cost of producing the good, which is normalized to zero. The key informational structure is that each …rm receives a conditionally-independent private signal about the underlying demand state at the beginning of each period. In addition, each …rm is assumed to observe, at the end of each period, the underlying demand and the charged prices of that period. Firms never observe their rivals'signals, however.
The accuracy of private signals is de…ned by the probability of observing a high (respectively, low) signal conditional on a high (respectively, low) underlying demand state. For example, when the information is perfectly accurate (respectively, completely useless), the accuracy is 1 (respectively, 1/2). This parameter plays a crucial role in determining the pricing behavior in the optimal collusion.
We restrict attention to a class of equilibria that have the following properties: (i) each …rm's pricing scheme at each period, which is a function of its private information into prices, depends only on the past public history, (ii) each …rm's strategy is sequentially rational, and (iii) after any public history, all players pricing schemes at the following period are identical. With 2 There are di¤erent types of price wars. A future price war might be triggered when the colluding …rms observe cheating or a suspicious market outcome. In a current price war, …rms are supposed to charge relatively low prices in order to reduce pro…ts of a potential deviator, who tries to cut the price to win the bigger market. 3 We assume that the demand state can be only high or low.
property (i) and (ii), equilibria must be perfect public equilibria (PPE). This excludes equilibria in which players adopt stage-game strategies that depend on their past private histories. With property (iii), we call an equilibrium strongly symmetric. 4 A typical example of a strongly symmetric equilibrium is one in which players cooperate until some history occurs which triggers a T-period Nash reversion before going back to cooperation.
We suppose colluding …rms choose a Pareto-optimal equilibrium among strongly symmetric perfect public equilibria (SSPPE). As in other repeated games, there are many equilibria in this model. This selection criterion may be justi…ed by allowing prior communication for the play among …rms; it is then not plausible that they would choose a Pareto-inferior equilibrium. 5 Firms' incentive constraints that de…ne their equilibrium strategies are central in our analysis. Following Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2002), we classify incentive constraints in the model into two parts. With o¤-schedule incentive constraints, each …rm has no incentive to charge a price that is not associated with any private signal. Violating this constraint will be detected for sure. If the discount factor is su¢ ciently large, a promise of a severe punishment (e.g., Nash reversion for good) will deter the …rms to violate this constraint, and a price associated with an o¤-schedule deviation is never observed in equilibrium. O¤ -schedule incentive constraints thus create no costs to …rms' equilibrium payo¤s since the corresponding punishments do not appear in equilibrium. On-schedule incentive constraints are relevant only when the …rms adopt sorting pricing schemes. With these constraints, each …rm has no incentive to charge a price that is associated with a private signal other than the one it receives, and the …rm therefore reveals the true signal through its pricing behavior. This is analogous to a self-selection mechanism that creates players' incentive to report their true type. It is well-known that creating such incentives is costly; the resulting allocation must be distorted from the …rst-best. Accordingly, providing on-schedule 4 Strictly speaking, a plain symmetric equilibrium refers to ex ante symmetry of the strategies, which does not imply (iii). For example, suppose each player plans to adopt a "friendly" pricing scheme at period 2 if, at period 1, the …rm charges the low price and the opponent charges the high price, whereas the …rm plans to adopt a "hostile" pricing schedule if the opposite outcome occurs at period 1. This is ex ante symmetric but not ex post because with some probability, players have di¤erent types of information, and they thus take di¤erent pricing schemes at period 2. Therefore this is not a strongly symmetric. 5 We take a naive approach in which players can commit to take some equilibrium strategy by pre-play communication. incentives in our model is costly.
Our main result is that repetition of a pooling pricing scheme is the outcome of the unique optimal SSPPE if the accuracy of private signals is low. Price rigidity must therefore arise by avoiding incentive costs if private signals contain poor information. A key fact is that the incentive costs to deter on-schedule deviations remain substantially large when private signals contain poor information. To see this, consider the two prices for the high and the low signals that maximize each …rm's expected stage-game payo¤ without any concern about cheating. These prices become closer as private signals gets less informative. With concerns about cheating, the …rms cannot adopt this pricing scheme unless charging the low price triggers a future "punishment,"otherwise a …rm which receives a high signal has an incentive to charge the low price. Instead, they may lower the price for a low signal so that a …rm with a high signal has no incentive to charge the low price without future punishments. Or, they can combine these two instruments to deter deviations. In any case, an SSPPE with a sorting pricing scheme requires substantial incentive costs caused by either substantial price distortion or signi…cant future punishments. On the other hand, the bene…t of adopting a sorting scheme vanishes as the information gets poorer. A rigid-pricing scheme thus becomes optimal if the accuracy is low since it saves lots of incentive costs without losing much gain.
The logic in the previous paragraph suggests that incentive costs and bene…ts from sorting pricing are associated with how close are the two prices …rms should charge without concerns about cheating. The two prices approaches to each other as the di¤erence between the high and low demands vanishes as well. Following this observation, we show that, in a simpler setting, for a …xed accuracy level, whether or not a price rigidity is optimal depends on the variance of the demand shock.
The precursors of this analysis are the two seminal papers in the literature on tacit collusion, Green and Porter (1984) , and Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) . Both papers analyze repeated interactions of …rms in an oligopolistic market in which the demand state stochastically ‡uctuates over time. These papers explains types of price wars as equilibrium outcomes, 6 but their mod-els do not have implications about price rigidity, a well-observed phenomenon in oligopolistic markets. Stiglitz (1984) argues that coordination costs due to informational asymmetry may result in price rigidity in a perfect equilibrium. He derives a particular type of equilibria, in which …rms'pricing scheme is rigid regardless of the underlying economic environment, but he does not investigate optimality of that equilibrium. Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2002) [ABS] provide a rigorous explanation for price rigidity as the outcome of the optimal equilibrium. They consider an in…nitely repeated Bertrand game in which each …rm has an i.i.d. cost shock, which occurs independently across …rms and is privately observed. Their contributions are twofold. First, they develop a new method of analyzing optimal collusion with private information by …nding a connection between the Pareto problem of the colluding …rms and the standard mechanism design problem. Second, by making use of this new method, they provide conditions under which price rigidity, either complete or partial, arises as the outcome of the optimal SSPPE.
The following three assumptions are important to ABS's results; (i) demand is inelastic, 7 (ii) private information is about each …rm's marginal cost, and (iii) it is independent across …rms and time. By these, some results in auction theory, such as the revenue equivalence theorem, the Mirrlees condition for incentive compatible mechanisms, and the optimal auction design, 8 can be fully utilized. ABS's optimal rigid pricing result is similar to the optimal mechanism in auction (or nonlinear pricing) with "bunching" or "ironing"of types, whereby di¤erent types are treated equally. This kind of mechanism might be optimal if the distribution of private information satis…es certain conditions. As long as the discount factor is su¢ ciently high, colluding …rms can sustain this optimal "mechanism" not by legal enforcement, but by "punishments"that deviator must su¤er from in equilibrium.
Our model di¤ers from ABS's in how private information arises, namely, we consider a demand shock of the homogeneous good market, which commonly a¤ects all …rms'current pro…ts, while ABS considers each …rm's temRotemberg and Saloner study a repeated Bertrand game with perfect information about the stochastic demand state. To sustain collusion during booms, the price might need to be lower than the monopoly price, in order to reduce the deviator's pro…t. This yields (current) price wars during booms. 7 ABS extend their result for su¢ ciently inelastic demand. 8 See, say, Myerson (1981) for those results.
porary cost shock, which a¤ects only its current pro…t. First, this gives a di¤erence in the property of static Nash equilibrium. In our model, regardless of the demand state, the unique Nash is charging zero. In ABS, the unique static Nash equilibrium is a sorting scheme, analogous to the equilibrium of a sealed-bid First Price Auction with symmetric bidders. A trivial PPE, a repetition of the stage-game Nash equilibrium, therefore has a di¤erent implication of the pricing pattern.
Another di¤erence lies in correlations of private information. In our model, private information is correlated across …rms whereas in ABS it is independent. Independent information and inelastic demand in ABS are in fact essential to their "no future price war"result; if there is an equilibrium that entails future price wars, there is another equilibrium that entails no future price war and that gives rise to the same ex ante payo¤. In other words, future any punishments can be transformed into some distortion in the pricing scheme without changing the entire payo¤. In ABS, price wars thus do not contribute to increasing the equilibrium payo¤s, and this fact reduces the scope of equilibria for the search of optimal collusion. In contrast, our model assumes interdependent information and elastic demand. As we will see, availability of future price wars can sometimes increase the equilibrium payo¤s in our model.
One advantage in our approach lies in the comparative statics. Our price rigidity result simply says that the tendency of price rigidity depends on how low is the accuracy of private signals. If proxy data for the accuracy are available, we can test the correlation between price rigidity and informational accuracy.
This paper is also related to Kandori (1992) . He considers how the set of equilibrium payo¤s is a¤ected by improvement of monitoring technology in a repeated game with imperfect monitoring. He shows that as the quality of monitoring technology improves in Blackwell's sense, the sequential equilibrium payo¤ set expands. This is similar to our main result: as the accuracy of signals increases, the set of SSPPE payo¤s basically expands. As the accuracy of private signals increases, price pro…les observed at the end of the period provide clearer information of how probable a cheating has occurred. At the same time, higher accuracy alters …rms'payo¤ structure; they expect higher expected payo¤s. This is in contrast to Kandori's model in which only improvement of monitoring technology is focused by keeping the payo¤ structure. In addition, the "monitoring technology"in our model is in fact endogenous; 9 if …rms use a pooling scheme, monitoring is "perfect" in the sense that they can detect cheating for sure, but if they use a sorting scheme, monitoring is imperfect in the conventional sense. This feature gives rise to an interesting implication in pricing behavior in an optimal collusion.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. In section 3 we derive characteristics of an optimal sorting equilibrium and the optimal pooling equilibrium. Section 4 compares the two kinds of optimal equilibria, and we …nd a region of the level of accuracy in which price-rigidity arises as the outcome of the optimal equilibrium. In addition, comparative statics are carried out in terms of the variance of the demand shock. Section 5 discusses brie ‡y the possible extensions of the model. We o¤er other discussions and conclusions in section 6.
The Model
Primitives Consider two …rms that play an in…nitely repeated Bertrand game with homogenous products. In each period, each …rm charges a price and the …rm charging a lower price wins the whole market. If two …rms charge the same price, they share the market equally. We assume that the marginal cost of production is equal between two …rms, and constant, which is further normalized to be 0.
In each period, the underlying demand can be high or low. Let S 2 fH; Lg denote the demand state and assume that they are equally likely, i.e., Pr(H) = Pr(L) = :5: The demand function for state S is denoted by D S (p) and the following conditions are satis…ed:
and D L (p) are both downward-sloping but not too convex so that the industry pro…t functions pD S (p); S 2 fH; Lg are strictly concave and di¤erentiable in p. Let S (p) = pD S (p); S 2 fH; Lg ; denote the total pro…t of the industry when …rms charge p and the underlying demand is S.
. Suppose also that some p > 0 exists such that D S (p) 0 for S 2 fH; Lg : Then we can restrict the set of price the …rms charge to the closed interval [0; p]: If the …rms are rational, they should charge prices less than p, otherwise the …rms incur net loss.
Demand is i.i.d. across periods. The …rms do not observe the actual demand state at the beginning of the period. Instead, each …rm receives a 9 ABS's model also shares this feature of the monitoring technology. ; the signals are informative: if a …rm receives a high signal, it is more likely that the underlying demand is high. An increase in improves the informativeness of signals in the sense of Blackwell (1953) . After each …rm receives its private signal, it determines a price to charge in the period. At the end of the period, both …rms observe the underlying demand and prices charged in the period. However, each …rm does not observe the opponent's signal. We …rst consider the stage game. A pricing strategy for …rm i is a function p i (s i );a mapping from the set of private signals, fh;`g, to the set of prices. When …rm i ( i; respectively) charges p i (p i ; respectively) and the demand state is S, the pro…t for …rm i is
where
This m i determines …rm i's market share. Thus, the expected stage payo¤ for …rm i is,
Since the marginal costs are 0, as we know from the standard Bertrand game with homogenous products, the stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium: both …rms charge price 0 and get no pro…t in every period. The …rms repeat the stage game in…nitely often. Let t = 0; 1; 2; ::: denote the time index. Each …rm's strategy is the mapping from the set of history to the set of pricing schedule. For each …rm, a history consists of the sequence of realized demand states and prices charged by the …rms (public history) and the signals the …rm received (private history). Let s t i denote the signal …rm i receives at period t; p t i denote the price …rm i charged at t; and S t denote the demand state at t: The set of public histories up to time t for …rm i is
Note that public histories are personalized because of the order of charged prices. The set of private histories up to time t for …rm i is
Thus the set of histories for …rm i is
A pure strategy of …rm i; i , is a mapping from
Thus, for any history h i ; i (h i )(s i ) is the price the …rm i charges with history h i and signal
Each …rm's payo¤ is the discounted sum of the stage payo¤s. Assume two …rms have the same discount factor ; and they are risk neutral. Thus for a sequence of pricing schedule fp
For notationaly simplicity, we supress private histories in strategies when we restrict attention to public strategies. Symmetric strategies among …rms are de…ned by
This says that if …rms face the same type of (personalized) history, they take the same pricing schedule. Note that a pro…le of symmetric strategies DOES NOT imply that all …rms are supposed to take the same pricing scheme along the play of the game. This is because, with a positive probability, they receive di¤erent private signals that may result in charging di¤erent prices. Firms therefore face di¤erent type of histories along the play of the game. We will focus on strategies that prescribe the same pricing schedule along the play, even when the …rms face di¤erent type of histories. To describe such strategies, we need some preparation. Let
2 be an operator that just ‡ips the price pro…le, i.e., T (p 1 ; p 2 ) = (p 2 ; p 1 ): Let h t p;i 0 denote a public history in which prices at each period are ‡ipped, i.e.,
i g: Strongly symmetric public strategies among …rms are de…ned by
Dynamic Programming Approach In the following analysis, we restrict attention to perfect public equilibria (PPE). That is, each player adopts a public strategy that is sequentially rational. Let V R 2 denote the set of payo¤ pro…les supported by some perfect public equilibrium. This is nonempty since repetition of the stage-game Nash equilibrium is a PPE, so (0; 0) 2 V :
Following Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986,1990), we adopt the dynamic programming approach. This approach enables us to treat equilibrium strategy as a sequence of one-shot games by decomposing the equilibrium play into two components: stage-game strategies p( ) = (p 1 ( ); p 2 ( )) and continuation values v( ) = (v 1 ( ); v 2 ( )); where v maps from the set of the end-of-period public information, (p 1 ; p 2 ; S), to PPE payo¤s, V : Namely, v e 2 R 2 is a payo¤ pro…le supported by a PPE i¤ some (p( ); v( )) exists such that, for all i;
We further restrict attention to strongly symmetric perfect public equilibria (SSPPE), i.e., each player adopts a strongly symmetric public strategy that is sequentially rational. In terms of APS approach, an SSPPE requires
10 Also, we assume that …rms have access to a public randomization device at the end of the period which assigns probabilities to the continuation values. This convexi…es the set of the PPE payo¤s. Let V s ( ; ) R denote the set of SSPPE payo¤s. It is well-known (APS (1986,1990)) that V s ( ; ) is the largest bounded invariant set generated by the following operator B : R R :
Proof. See Appendix.
Search for the Most Collusive SSPPE We assume that the colluding …rms play an SSPPE that achieves the highest payo¤, v( ; ): By Lemma 1 we already know that such v( ; ) exists, but we do not know what is the equilibrium strategy pro…le that achieves v( ; ); and what is the implication regarding the …rms'pricing behavior and so on. In the following section, we will characterize v( ; ) for patient …rms and derive some implications on the …rms'pricing behavior. From the dynamic programming approach, the highest payo¤ v( ; ) is characterized by solving the following programming problem:
The above IC constraint is an ex ante constraint. Each …rm chooses its pricing schedule before knowing its private signal. We can alternatively consider this constraint as a system of incentive constraints from the interim viewpoint, i.e., after observing its private signal, each …rm has no incentive to charge a di¤erent price. Then we can classify these incentive constraints into two groups: (i) on-schedule constraints; if each …rm is supposed to use a sorting pricing schedule, it does not have an incentive to charge the price for a signal that it does not receive. Note that if a …rm adopts a pooling scheme, there is no need for this constraint. (ii) O¤-schedule constraints; each …rm does not have an incentive to charge any price other than those in the pricing schedule. When such a price is observed, they can immediately tell that the …rm charging it has deviated from the equilibrium strategy.
Based on the above argument, we rewrite the programming problem from the interim viewpoint. For this purpose, we need to give one more notation: The interim equilibrium payo¤ v k ; k = h;`is de…ned as
Then the above programming problem is rewritten as
Because of the signal structure, the probability that a …rm receives high signal is a half and hence the objective function is just the average of the interim payo¤s. The …rst two constraints are the on-schedule constraints: The …rst one is the downward incentive constraint (DIC), which deters the …rm to charge the price for the low signal when it receives the high signal. The second one is the upward incentive constraint (UIC), which is de…ned similarly. The last two constraints are the o¤-schedule constraints: any clear deviation by charging some pricep i di¤erent from p (h) or p (`) ; is not pro…table.
Collusion among Patient Firms
In this section, we analyze the problem (P) and derive implications of the solution. To simplify the analysis, we assume that …rms are patient enough so that the o¤-schedule incentive compatibility constraints do not bind; the …rms trigger a perpetual Nash reversion, which is quite costly for patient …rms. This punishment appears only o¤-the-equilibrium path, and it therefore does not a¤ect the equilibrium payo¤s. Thus we simply set the continuation payo¤s equal to zero for clear deviations, and drop the o¤-schedule incentive constraints from the programming problem.
Possible Forms of Solutions
For a solution to the programming problem (P), the pricing schedule p ( ) exhibits either sorting, p(h) 6 = p(`) or pooling, p(h) = p(`): Suppose …rst it is pooling. Note that the on-schedule IC constraints are trivial. The solution is then easily characterized for a su¢ ciently high discount factor : the continuation payo¤ is v( ; ) if there is no deviation, 0 if either …rm deviates, and the pooling scheme must use a price that maximizes the ex-ante stage-game pro…t, i.e., p = arg max H (p) + L (p) : An important implication from an optimal pooling solution is that the corresponding equilibrium outcome must be a repetition of the same price, i.e., it exhibits price rigidity. Thus, in order to show that a price rigidity scheme is optimal, we only need to show that a solution to (P) has a pooling pricing schedule.
A solution to (P) may have a sorting pricing schedule, p(h) 6 = p(`). The following lemma assures that a schedule with p (h) < p (`) can never be optimal.
Lemma 2 A pricing scheme p(h) < p(`) is never optimal to (P).
In order to reap the gain of information contained in the signals, the price for each signal should be biased toward the monopoly price for the more likely underlying demand. As a result, a scheme with p (h) < p (`) would be never optimal. For a sorting scheme we can therefore restrict our attention to the case p(h) > p(`) without loss of generality.
An optimal SSPPE will exhibit either
The best pooling scheme is easily derived for a su¢ ciently high discount factor. It is harder to derive an optimal equilibrium within SSPPE whose pricing schedule is sorting.
Sorting Pricing Scheme

The Programming Problem with Sorting Pricing Scheme
We look for a solution to the problem (P) with a restriction on the pricing schedule being sorting, given the accuracy . To simplify the notations,
; with p h > p`. Assume again that the discount factor is high enough to ensure o¤-schedule incentive constraints hold by using perpetual Nash reversion. The only relevant incentive constraints are therefore on-schedule incentive constraints, i.e., a party charges the designated price according to the private signal it receives.
Stage-game Interim Payo¤s Consider a sorting pricing scheme p( ); with p h > p`; and a continuation payo¤ schedule v( ; ; ) that satisfy all the constraints to (P). Let h and `d enote the interim stage-game payo¤s following the pricing schedule p( ) for a party that receives h and`; respectively. The interim stage-game payo¤ h is therefore
Given that …rm i receives signal h, with probability 2 the underlying demand is high and the other …rm also receives a high signal and charge the price p h , in this case each …rm get H (p h )=2. With probability (1 ) the underlying demand is high and the other …rm receives a low signal, in this case …rm i gets 0. With probability (1 ) the underlying demand is low and the other …rm receives a low signal, in this case …rm i also gets 0. With probability (1 ) 2 the underlying demand is low and the other …rm also receives a high signal, in this case both …rms get
Similarly, the interim stage-game payo¤
Suppose
Similarly, a …rm's interim payo¤ if it receives`and charges p h , is
Continuation Payo¤s and Interim Value Functions At the end of each period, the …rms observe a public outcome that consists of two parts : S 2 fH; Lg; the underlying demand and (p i p j ), p i ; p j 2 [0; p]; the prices charged in that period. Since patient …rms never charge prices other than p h or p`; the possible combinations of prices are fp h p h ; p`p h ; p h p`; p`p`g. As mentioned before, for the other combination of the prices, the …rm will trigger a perpetual Nash reversion. Thus, we only need to consider the continuation payo¤s corresponding to the possible public outcomes (p i p j ; S) 2 fp h p h ; p`p h ; p h p`; p`p`g fH; Lg: De…ne v S ij as the continuation payo¤ if the underlying demand is S and …rm i charges p i and …rm j charges p j in last period. Recall that strong symmetry of the PPE imposes a restriction that both …rms have the same continuation payo¤ for any public outcome. Therefore we must have v
Recall v h is a …rm's interim expected average payo¤ when it receives signal h and following equilibrium strategy, the Bellman's equation for v h is the following:
With probability 2 the underlying demand is high and the other …rm also receives a high signal and charges p h , in this case the public outcome at the end of this period is p h p h ; H ; and the …rm gets a continuation payo¤ v H hh . With probability (1 ) the underlying demand is high and the other …rm receives a low signal and charges p`, in this case the public outcome at the end of this period is p h p`; H ; the …rm gets a continuation payo¤ v
With probability (1 ) the underlying demand is low and the other …rm receives a low signal and charges p`, in this case the public outcome at the end of this period is p h p`; L , the …rm gets a continuation payo¤ v L h`. With probability (1 ) 2 the underlying demand is low and the other …rm also receives a high signal and charges p h , in this case the public outcome at the end of this period is p h p h ; L ; and the …rm gets a continuation payo¤ v L hh . Similarly, the Bellman's equation for v`is the following:
Let v 
With probability 2 the public outcome at the end of this period is p`p h ; H . With probability (1 ) the public outcome at the end of this period is p`p`; H . With probability (1 ) the public outcome at the end of this period is p`p`; L . With probability (1 ) 2 the public outcome at the end of this period is p`p h ; L . Similarly, let vd be a …rm's interim expected average payo¤ when it receives signal`and charges p h , the Bellman's equation for vd is the following:
The Programming Problem with sorting Pricing Scheme Subject to (2)- (9), consider the following programming problem (P-Sep)
S 2 fH; Lg ; ij 2 fhh; h`;``g :
The maximum value v F S represents the highest value by adopting a "fullysorting"pricing scheme: Notice that v( ; ) in (P) is replaced by v in (P-Sep). This is because we do not know the value v( ; ).
If indeed a solution to (P) has a sorting pricing scheme, we must have v F S ( ; v( ; ); ) = v( ; ): In order to …nd v( ; ); we therefore need to …nd the highest v that satis…es v F S ( ; v; ) = v; and compare it with the highest value suppoted by a pooling scheme. Let v F S ( ; ) denote such v if it exists: If v F S ( ; ) is larger than the value of the best pooling scheme, it must be a solution to (P).
The Relaxed Problem
Among the constraints of the programming problem (P-Sep), we …rst ignore the UIC constraint and try to solve the following relaxed problem:
Binding DIC For a solution to (P-Sep'), the DIC may or may not bind. If the DIC is slack, all of the continuation payo¤ must be the maximum, v; and the stage-game deviation gain must therefore be non-positive, i.e., h h d : This is possible if the di¤erence between p h and p`is large enough. However, if the accuracy of signals is not so high, the prices p h and ps hould not be so far apart in order to capture the informational gain from the signals. The DIC thus binds for a solution to (P-Sep') if is low. The objective of this paper is to establish the optimality of a rigid-price equilibrium when is low, and therefore we are mainly interested in the cases in which the DIC tends to bind. To simplify the following analysis, we give a condition under which the DIC always binds for a solution to (P-Sep') for each : This additional assumption is certainly non-essential to our results.
Recall that p
Assumption 1 says that the prices that attain peaks of H and L are not so far away from each other.
Lemma 3 Under Assumption 1, the DIC must bind for a solution to (PSep').
E¤ective Reduction of Continuation Payo¤s
When the DIC binds, we typically have to reduce some of the continuation payo¤s. Reduction of continuation payo¤s has two e¤ects: relaxing the DIC constraint and reducing the equilibrium value. Not all of the continuation payo¤s are e¤ective for relaxing the DIC. For example, if the public outcome is (p h p h ; H), it is clear that the …rm that receives h has behaved honestly. This implies that, after observing that outcome, the corresponding continuation value v H hh must be as high as possible, namely, v. Certainly, reduction of this continuation payo¤ does not help change the DIC constraint. Now we identify the continuation payo¤s that are ine¤ective to relax the DIC. By checking (6) and (8) Lemma 4 For an optimal solution to (P-Sep'), v
Public outcomes indicate how likely cheating has occurred. For this relaxed programming problem, the relevant cheating is only for …rms receiving a high signal to charge p`. The public outcome p h p h ; H and (p h p h ; L) cannot arise if one …rm receiving h charges p`: No punishment is thus necessary after these outcomes. The public outcome p h p`; L indicates not much evidence of the relevant cheating since the underlying demand is low, and the …rm having charged p`is therefore more likely to be honest than to cheat. Reducing the continuation payo¤ for p h p`; L thus a¤ects more on the equilibrium value than the deviation payo¤, and therefore the DIC becomes more di¢ cult to hold.
The other continuation payo¤s can relax the DIC constraint, but the e¤ectiveness di¤ers across them. After substituting the results of lemma 4, the DIC constraint can be rewritten as
Similarly, the ex-ante value function becomes
Now let us calculate the "cost"of relaxing the DIC by one unit, i.e., the resulting decrease in the value function. The following table is instructive (note that the discount factor is ignored):
The second column shows how much of the corresponding continuation payo¤ need to be reduced in order to decrease v Note also that for = :5;
ave the same e¤ect. This analysis gives the following proposition:
This proposition gives the idea of which continuation value must be reduced …rst, second, and third, to achieve the highest value to (P-Sep'). If a continuation payo¤ is reduced, both the interim value and the deviation pro…t change. These changes depend on the probabilities that the outcome arises, given that the party follows the pricing scheme (on-path) or that it deviates (o¤-path). The likelihood ratio, de…ned as the ratio of the on-path probability to the o¤-path one, measures how much expected payo¤ will be reduced from the interim value per unit of reduction in the deviation pro…t. Clearly a continuation payo¤ of a smaller likelihood ratio must be reduced before one of a larger ratio as we see in the above.
It seems a little odd to rank (p`p`; H) over (p`p h ; H) regardless of ; because, for > 2=3; (p`p h ; H) occurs more likely than (p`p`; H); if one party cheats. However, it occurs more likely on the equilibrium path as well. The reduction in this continuation outcome is therefore quite "costly"under SSPPE. If we can use asymmetric continuation payo¤s, i.e., v(p h ; p`; S) 6 = v(p`; p h ; S); the outcome (p`p h ; H) becomes much more convenient to deter a deviation without reducing the interim value much, since we can punish one party which has charged p`and reward the other.
We do not see that discreteness of public outcome space a¤ects the above results. We therefore conjecture that the same result obtains in a more general setup such as one with a continuum of public outcomes: all the public outcomes can be ranked according to the likelihood ratio.
Upper Bound of the Value of Sorting Equilibria Proposition 1 implies that, for an optimal solution to (P-Sep'), if the continuation payo¤ for an outcome v
oes not reach a lower bound, i.e., 0; then the other continuation payo¤s must be v. This in turn implies that if we further relax the constraints of (P-Sep') so that there were no lower bound for v H`; an optimal solution to this further relaxed problem would entail v S ij = v for (S; ij) 6 = (H;``): Note that the solution of this further relaxed problem gives an upper bound of the maximum value of (P-Sep'). For our objective to show optimality of rigid pricing scheme for a low accuracy of signals, checking this value of the further relaxed problem su¢ ces since it serves as an upper bound of the value of sorting equilibria.
Here we solve the problem by setting the highest value v for the continuation payo¤s other than v H`: The relaxed programming problem can be simpli…ed as the following:
As before v f sr ( ; ) is de…ned as the highest …xed point of v f sr ( ; v; ) = v; if it exists.
Lemma 5 An optimal solution to (P-Sep") is given by
Proof: By Lemma 3, the DIC for an optimal solution must bind under Assumption 1. Substituting the DIC into the objective function, we get
We need to maximize (10) with respect to p h and p`: Thus,
which is independent of . If = 1=2; p`can be anything, as long as p`< p h and v H`i s chosen so that the DIC holds with equality. Thus we take p` = p
Thus, the optimal value is
and this implies that
This completes the proof.
Pooling Pricing Scheme
Firms can also adopt a pooling pricing scheme. This scheme is essentially di¤erent from the sorting pricing equilibrium; there is no on-schedule deviation for a pooling pricing scheme, since on the equilibrium path …rms always charge the same price. Since we assume that …rms are so patient that no o¤-schedule deviation is pro…table, the highest equilibrium payo¤ by adopting a pooling pricing scheme is characterized by the following programming problem:
Then the highest equilibrium payo¤ is
If this is indeed the highest SSPPE payo¤, it must be equal to v( ; ), i.e.,
and the equilibrium outcome of this SSPPE exhibits repetition of the above pooling pricing, i.e., price rigidity. Note that p r , and correspondingly v r are independent of the accuracy of the private signals .
Optimality of Rigid Pricing
We have so far characterized an optimal pooling scheme and an upper bound of equilibrium payo¤ for a sorting pricing scheme. If the upper bound v f sr ( ; ) is smaller than v r ; the optimal SSPPE must exhibit price rigidity.
Proposition 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and the discount factor is high enough to ignore all the o¤-schedule constraints in the above problems. There exists a b such that for 2 [:5; b ]; the pricing scheme for an optimal solution to (P) must be pooling.
Proof: From now on, let us include the accuracy level in the interim stage-game pro…t functions, so
Note that the RHS is constant. Now we will show (i) that the LHS is smaller than the RHS for = :5; (ii) that the LHS is larger than the RHS for = 1; and (iii) that the LHS is increasing in : Let LHS( ) denote the LHS in (15) as a function of :
(i) First, note that p h ! p r as ! :5 (see (2) and (11)). Then
(ii) Similarly,
The inequality follows from the fact that p h (1) = arg max H (p); and p` = arg max L (p): (iii) By taking the derivative of LHS;
The second equality follows by the envelope theorem. The inequality follows by Proposition 2 can be understood in the following intuitive way. Compared to the sorting pricing scheme, the pooling pricing scheme has both an advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage is that the parties can enforce it without a fear of cheating, since there is no on-schedule deviation in this scheme. In contrast, the sorting pricing scheme entails "punishment"on the equilibrium path even though the parties behaves honestly in equilibrium. This is regarded as a coordination cost due to incentive compatibility. On the other hand, a pooling scheme does not utilize the information about demand at all; if signals are informative, i.e., > 1=2; and if the incentive compatibility were not an issue, …rms' expected pro…ts should increase by charging di¤erent prices for di¤erent signals. This is regarded as an informational gain from signals. A pooling pricing scheme avoids the coordination cost but discards the informational gain at the same time.
Which scheme is better depends on the relative magnitudes of the information gain to the coordination cost. When the accuracy of signal is su¢ ciently low ( is close to :5), the informational gain is close to 0, since signals are not informative about the demand. But the coordination cost is strictly positive, since the …rms have to deter the on-schedule deviation. As a result, a pooling pricing scheme is strictly better.
We conjecture that the maximum value of sorting equilibria, v F S ( ; ); instead of its upper bound, v f sr ( ; ); will be increasing in and having the same property as v f sr ( ; ), so that we would obtain a stronger result such as " v F S ( ; ) v r i¤ ^ :" It is clear that for the perfectly accurate signal, there is no concern about the on-schedule incentive constraints, and the optimal solution must therefore be sorting and give a higher value. If the value function v F S ( ; ) is monotonic, the stronger result obtains. This is, at this point, for future research.
Price Rigidity An immediate implication of Proposition 2 is that, if the accuracy of signals is low enough and …rms adopt an optimal SSPPE, they charge the same price, p r ; over time regardless of their private signals on the equilibrium path. We summarize this …nding through the following proposition:
Proposition 3 When the accuracy of signal is less than^ , …rms will adopt a pooling pricing scheme, therefore the outcome of the optimal SSPPE exhibits price rigidity.
To give some sense of how big this b is, we provide a concrete example. Suppose that the demand functions are D H (p) = 1:2 p and D L (p) = 1 p, and the discount factor is = 0:9. Then p r = 0:55 and v r = 1:21=8. The cuto¤ value b = 0:986.. In this example, the range of for which a price rigidity scheme is optimal is very big.
This result is consistent with Scherer's (1980) observation that we have cited in introduction; the most collusive …rms adopt a price rigidity scheme to avoid a coordination cost. Note that without a coordination cost, the …rms will always adjust their prices according to their private signals, as long as their signals are informative ( > 0:5). The existence of a coordination cost signi…cantly reduces the attractiveness of a sorting scheme. Proposition 4 Suppose that the ‡uctuation of demand is driven by a constant term, i.e.,
Then, the smaller the di¤erence between the low demand and the high demand, i.e., the smaller is a > 0; the bigger the pooling pricing region (i.e., the higher the b ). Thus, given the accuracy of signal , the smaller the di¤erence between the low demand and the high demand, the more likely that the pooling pricing scheme is optimal.
The intuition for this result is the following. As the di¤erence between D H ( ) and D L ( ) increases, in the …rst-best world (perfect information) the informational gain from adopting a sorting scheme increases. Thus in a world of imperfect information, the larger di¤erence between the high and the low demands makes a pooling scheme less attractive. As a result, the price rigidity range of shrinks. This comparative result predicts that the lower the demand ‡uctuation, the more likely that price rigidity scheme is optimal.
Possible Extensions
Our model is highly stylized. There are only two …rms in the industry and there are only two underlying demand states. In this section, we brie ‡y discuss how our results can be generalized. We start with the case of more than two …rms.
More Firms With more …rms in an industry, the results still carry through. The coordination costs of adopting a sorting scheme is positive for a small accuracy level, while the informational gain vanishes if goes to 1/2. Therefore, there is b such that for 2 [ ; b ), a rigid-price scheme is optimal. The coordination cost never vanishes as the number of …rms increases. If a …rm that charges the high price receives a stage-game pro…t, it need to share the industry pro…t with all the other …rms. Moreover, the probability that all …rms charge the high price on the equilibrium path decreases as the number of …rms increases. Thus the expected stage-game pro…t for a …rm receiving h is decreasing rapidly. On the other hand, if the …rm receiving h cheats, the stage-game deviation pro…t is not so low because there is some probability that this …rm shares the entire industry pro…t with a small number of …rms (possibly by itself).
Clearly, the informational gain of adopting a sorting scheme vanishes as goes to 1/2 independent of the number of …rms. Hence the number of …rms does not a¤ect the results at least qualitatively.
More Underlying States The basic logic of the results remains valid if the number of underlying states increases. If informativeness of signals is low, the incentive compatibility condition for any kind of sorting pricing scheme causes a coordination cost, which remains positive even though informativeness vanishes. The informational gain clearly disappears as the informativeness of signals vanishes.
If the underlying states are more than two, …rms may …nd it optimal to adopt a partially sorting pricing scheme. Depending on the structure of primitives, they may want to partition the underlying states and to charge the same price for states in each group. An optimal non-rigid scheme is harder to characterize, but as discussed above, a rigid pricing scheme must be optimal for a su¢ ciently low accuracy of signals.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper studies pricing behavior of a collusive industry when demand is ‡uctuating and individual …rms receive private information on demand in each period. Our model provides a theoretical micro-foundation for price rigidity. In particular, we …nd that predictability of the underlying demand, modeled as accuracy of private information, plays a crucial role in determining an industry's optimal pricing scheme. If demand is poorly predictable from private information, then …rms tend to adopt a rigid-pricing scheme; the prices do not vary at all while the demand varies over time. Optimality of a rigid-pricing scheme also depends on the variance of the demand shock, given the predictability of the underlying demand. If the variance is su¢ ciently small, …rms optimally adopt a price rigidity scheme.
We have restricted our attention to the SSPPE. An asymmetric perfect public equilibrium (APPE) may improve the equilibrium payo¤ as found in Athey and Bagwell (2001) . There is indeed a simple APPE which can get rid of the coordination costs of fully-sorting equilibrium: two …rms take turn in serving the whole market; in the period that one …rm is allowed to sell, the other …rm is not supposed to interfere the selling …rm. In this way, the selling …rm can charge a price according to its private information (so information can be utilized), and any deviation of the other …rm will be detected. This APPE is not so plausible; as the number of …rms increases, the …rms need to wait for their turns so that the o¤-schedule incentive constraint becomes harder to hold. Moreover, this kind of behavior will be detected easily by the anti-trust agencies.
In contrast, the SSPPE is plausible for several reasons. First, the strategies supporting an SSPPE are relatively simple whereas an APPE may require more complicated strategies. Thus to support an APPE, …rms need to be more sophisticated. Second, the informal literature highlights …rms'fear of industry-wide breakdowns in collusion, which correspond to symmetric punishment scheme in our SSPPE.
We have not addressed communications among the …rms. Communication can in principle avoid the coordination problem and thus improves the e¢ ciency of a sorting scheme. However, the plausibility of communications among the …rms is not clear because of the following reasons. First, if the enforcement of anti-trust law is stringent, …rms may optimally avoid communications which could be used for the evidence of collusion. Second, as the number of …rms increases, communications among the …rms become more tedious. For these reasons, we have restricted our attention to the case without communication.
As seen in the last section, our model can be extended in less stylized ways without changing the main results. One restrictive assumption that we have maintained throughout the paper is the i.i.d. demand shock. It looks more plausible to include business cycles explicitly in the model. This is left for future research.
Our model provides a new theory to explain price rigidity. We show that use of private information about the underlying demand is key to price rigidity. Our theory waits for empirical investigations, with an appropriate proxy of accuracy of private signals. Also, the existing literature addresses several other explanations for rigid prices. Which theory has a more explanation power is also an interesting empirical question to be addressed in the future research.
0 assures zero payo¤. In addition, v max pD H (p) is impossible either since it requires on average at least the monopoly pro…t corresponding to the high demand.
Since V s ( ; ) is the largest invariant set, it su¢ ces to show that B maps a compact set to a compact set. Consider a nonempty compact subset V R and let v min = min V: Boundedness of B(V ) is straightforward since each component of the value function is bounded. Now we wish to show closedness of B(V ): Take a convergent sequence fw n g B (V ) ; w n ! w and let (p n ; v n ) be the corresponding pricing strategy and the continuation payo¤ mapping.
Since prices other than p n (h) or p n (`) do not appear in the value function, the pair (p n ;ṽ n ) satis…es the value function for w n : Moreover, the incentive constraint must be satis…ed since v n ṽ n in the entire domain. This shows that we can use (p n ;ṽ n ) to support w n : Notice that the pair (p n ;ṽ n ) is characterized by a point in a …nite-dimensional Euclidean space, namely, (p
; S); s i ; s i = h;`; S = H; Lg): By de…nition, this point is in a compact set. Therefore, without loss of generality, the sequence converges to a point (p h ; p `; fṽ (p s i ; p s i ; S); s i ; s i = h;`; S = H; Lg); and this de…nes (p ;ṽ ) in the same manner as (p n ;ṽ n ): Recalling that the probability is discrete, continuity shows that
Thus to complete the proof, it su¢ ces to show
Since the function u has some discontinuity due to market sharing, we need to consider several cases separately. First, suppose the limits of prices p h and p `a re distinct. In this case, for su¢ ciently large N; p n h 6 = p ǹ ; 8n > N: Then, we do not need to consider discontinuity for large N as well as in the limit. Therefore, by continuity, the desired result obtains. Next, suppose the limits of prices p h and p `c oincide, i.e., lim p 
(to get the last equation, recall that the …rms charge the same price regardless of the signals and thus they share the market equally). Similarly, we have u(p n 0 ( ); p n 0 ( )) ! u(p ( ); p ( )) if we take a subsequence from N < : Hence with the original sequence we must have u (p n ( ) ; p n ( )) ! u (p ( ) ; p ( )) : This shows that w 2 B(V ) and thus B(V ) is closed. Therefore, B(V ) is compact.
Proof of Lemma 2: Consider a pricing scheme and continuation payo¤s that satisfy all the constraints of (P `) ) and the stage game payo¤ is therefore larger. The on-path continuation payo¤s cannot be smaller than the original equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose the DIC is slack for an optimal solution to (PSep'). Then the continuation payo¤s following the on-path outcomes must be v; otherwise there is some room to increase one of those continuation payo¤s without violating the DIC and it increases the value.
Also, the optimal prices p h and p`must be (1 )(1 + )
(note that these p h and p`are well-de…ned since the expressions in the RHS's are strictly convex and that these prices satisfy p h > p`), otherwise we can increase the value without violating the DIC.
In This implies that
We have already seen that v That is, the cuto¤ b decreases as the di¤erence between the high demand and low demand increases.
